Another Look at the Eurobarometer Surveys by Hubbard, William
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and
Economics Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
2012
Another Look at the Eurobarometer Surveys
William Hubbard
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
William H. J. Hubbard, "Another Look at the Eurobarometer Surveys" (Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Working Paper
No. 615, 2012).
  
 
CHICAGO  
INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 615 
(2D SERIES) 
 
 
 
Another Look at the Eurobarometer Surveys 
 
William H. J. Hubbard 
 
 
 
 
THE LAW SCHOOL 
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 
 
October 2012 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge at: 
The University of Chicago, Institute for Law and Economics Working Paper Series Index: 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html 
and at the Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection. 
  
ANOTHER LOOK AT THE EUROBAROMETER SURVEYS 
WILLIAM H. J. HUBBARD* 
The current proposal for a Common European Sales Law (CESL) makes a 
number of empirical claims in support of its argument that differences in 
contract law among Member States are stifling trade, and that CESL will 
address these barriers to cross-border trade. These empirical claims rest 
largely on citations to a number of Flash Eurobarometer surveys and other 
surveys of businesses and consumers. A closer look at these surveys reveals 
that the cited statistics do not support the claims that contract-law-related 
obstacles present special barriers to cross-border trade for small- and medium-
sized enterprises and consumers. Instead, a more ambiguous picture emerges – 
one that may cast doubt on several of the design features of CESL. I conclude 
that a more careful assessment of the empirical foundations for CESL 
(whether in its current or a revised form) is necessary. 
1. Introduction 
Last year, the European Commission published its Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a 
Common European Sales Law (“Proposal”).1 The Proposal is the 
product of extensive study and the latest manifestation of the 
momentum in many quarters toward harmonization of European 
contract law. The proposed Common European Sales Law (CESL) has 
engendered a spirited debate about its costs and benefits.2 Notable 
features of CESL include: its optional character as an opt-in regime of 
sales law applicable to cross-border contracts; its applicability only to 
business-to-business (B2B) contracts involving small- or medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) and business-to-consumer (B2C) contracts; its 
reliance on custom and usage in the B2B context; and its extensive, 
mandatory consumer protection provisions in the B2C context. As 
evidenced by the other papers in this volume, abler contracts scholars 
than myself have offered both criticism and defense of these features. 
                                               
* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School. I thank 
Lisa Bernstein for drawing my attention to the Eurobarometer surveys, and 
Nicole Cherry, Andrew Spruiell, and Shuang Tian Yang for valuable research 
assistance. 
1 COM 635(2011) final. 
2 The papers presented at European Contract Law: A Law-and-Economics 
Perspective and collected in this volume provide a small sampling of this 
debate. 
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Given this heated debate, one is tempted to ask if CESL is worth 
the considerable effort and controversy attending it. To this question 
the Proposal offers a clear answer. The Proposal opens with these 
words: 
Differences in contract law between Member States hinder traders 
and consumers who want to engage in cross-border trade within 
the internal market. The obstacles which stem from these 
differences dissuade traders, small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SME) in particular, from entering cross border trade or expanding 
to new Member States’ markets. Consumers are hindered from 
accessing products offered by traders in other Member States.3 
In other words, whatever the strengths or weaknesses of its particular 
details, CESL or something like it is needed. Current disuniformity in 
contract law across Europe is stifling trade, especially by SMEs. 
This is an empirical claim. More precisely, the Proposal’s language 
quoted above contains a bundle of four empirical claims: 
Claim 1: There are a significant number of traders in the EU, and 
in particular SMEs, who want engage in cross-border trade or 
increase their cross-border trade, but do not. 
Claim 2: Obstacles created by differences in contract law are an 
impediment to cross-border trade, especially for SMEs. 
Claim 3: There are a significant number of consumers in the EU 
who want to make cross-border purchases, but cannot.  
Claim 4: Obstacles created by differences in contract law are an 
impediment to cross-border purchases by consumers. 
These empirical claims are the central justification for CESL.4 With 
respect to SMEs, if the first claim is not true, then there is no problem 
to solve; and if the second claim is not true, then CESL will not solve 
the problem. Likewise, for consumers, if the third claim is not true, 
then there is no problem to solve; and if the fourth claim is not true, 
then CESL will not solve the problem. 
                                               
3 Proposal, 2. 
4 There are other important justifications as well, such as fostering a common 
European legal identity and establishing shared values throughout Europe. 
See, Mak, “In Defense of CESL,” this volume. 
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The Proposal does not make these claims without offering evidence 
to support them. The European Commission sponsored studies to 
address aspects of these claims, and the Proposal expressly cites this 
empirical data. In particular, the Proposal cites two surveys, Flash 
Eurobarometer 320 and 321, to point out that “traders ranked 
contract-law-related obstacles among the top barriers to cross-border 
trade.”5 (Flash EB 320 surveyed enterprises engaged in B2B 
transactions, and Flash 321 surveyed enterprises engaged in B2C 
transactions.) This suggests that contract law is a major impediment 
to cross-border trade, and it raises the possibility that a large number 
of traders are dissuaded from cross-border trade. 
The Proposal’s companion document, A Common European Sales 
Law to Facilitate Cross-Border Transactions in the Single Market 
(“Companion Document”),6 cites Flash Eurobarometer 299 as evidence 
of the small number of European consumers currently purchasing 
online from other countries.7 The Companion Document also cites the 
Third Edition of the Consumer Markets Scoreboard (“Scoreboard”),8 for 
the claim that “attempts to purchase products online more often fail 
than succeed in a cross-border context.”9  This suggests that contract 
law may be a major obstacle to cross-border activity by consumers as 
well. 
                                               
5 Proposal, 2. Flash Eurobarometer 320, “European contract law in business-
to-business transactions” (Flash EB 320) was a survey conducted by the 
Gallup Organization in January 2011 of 6,475 managers at enterprises in the 
27 EU member states. See Summary, Flash EB 320 (2011) and Analytical 
Report, Flash EB 320 (2011). Flash Eurobarometer 321, “European contract 
law in consumer transactions” (Flash EB 321) was a survey conducted by the 
Gallup Organization in January 2011 of 6,465 managers at enterprises in the 
27 EU member states. See Summary, Flash EB 320 (2011) and Analytical 
Report, Flash EB 320 (2011). All Summaries and Analytical Reports for the 
cited Flash EB surveys are available at 
<ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/flash_arch_en.htm> (last visited 12 
Sept. 2012). 
6 COM 636(2011) final. 
7 Companion Document, 3. Flash Eurobarometer 299, “Consumer attitudes 
towards cross-border trade and consumer protection” (Flash EB 299), was a 
survey conducted by the Gallup Organization in September 2010 of 25,139 
individuals in the 27 EU member states. See Summary, Flash EB 299 (March 
2011). Components of this survey were reported as Flash Eurobarometer 
299a, “Attitudes towards cross-border trade and consumer protection” (Flash 
EB 299a). See Analytical Report, Flash EB 229a (2011). 
8 SEC 385(2010), 9. 
9 Companion Document, 3. 
4 William H. J. Hubbard  
 
Given that this survey data provides the empirical foundation for 
the perceived need that motivates CESL, these studies deserve a 
closer look. In this paper, I undertake to do this.10 This paper assesses 
the degree to which the Flash EB surveys support the four central 
empirical claims in the Proposal. Section 2 focuses on claims about 
SMEs (claims 1 and 2). Section 3 focuses on claims about consumers 
(claims 3 and 4).  
What I find is that the Flash EB and other surveys cited by the 
Proposal offer an ambiguous picture of the extent to which contract 
law may create obstacles to cross-border trade by businesses and 
consumers. These surveys do not suggest that there are large numbers 
of discouraged traders, or that contract law is in practice a major 
obstacle to cross-border trade. They are consistent, however, with the 
proposition that a small, but economically significant, number of 
traders and consumers are discouraged from cross-border trade by 
differences in European contract law. To prove this latter proposition 
will require further, and more careful, study. 
2. Empirical Evidence on Cross-Border Trade, Contract 
Law, and SMEs 
Claim 1 is that there are a significant number of traders, in particular 
SMEs, who want to (but do not) engage in cross-border trade or 
increase the number of Member States with which they trade. The 
Proposal itself provides a brief statement of the empirical basis for 
this fundamental claim: “Currently, only one in ten [EU] traders, 
involved in the sale of goods, exports within the Union and the 
majority of those who do only export to a small number of member 
states.”11 This statement can be broken down into two separate, 
component claims: 
                                               
10 The survey micro-data, or “primary data,” for these surveys is publicly 
available through GESIS, <www.gesis.org> (last visited 12 Sept. 2012). All 
data from the Flash EB 320 and 321 surveys presented in this paper are 
based on this primary data; there may be slight discrepancies between the 
summary statistics generated by this data and those presented in the 
corresponding Analytical Reports or Summaries for the surveys. I rely solely 
on the Summaries and Analytical Reports for the Flash EB 299 and Flash EB 
299a surveys. 
11 Proposal, 2. 
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(1) “currently, only one in 10 [EU] traders, involved in the sale of 
goods, exports within the Union.”12 
(2) “the majority of those who do only export to a small number of 
member states.” 
These two statements together capture the two crucial aspects in 
which barriers to trade, including contract-law-related barriers, may 
hinder cross-border trade. The first statement refers to the extensive 
margin. By “extensive margin,” I mean the extent to which new 
businesses may be willing to enter cross-border trade if barriers to 
trade are lowered. The second statement refers to the intensive 
margin. By “intensive margin,” I mean how intensively companies 
already engaged in cross-border trade can participate in trade with 
other countries; i.e., businesses already engaged in cross-border trade 
may be willing to trade with a greater number of Member States if 
barriers to trade fall. 
I look at each margin in turn. 
2.1  The extensive margin 
The fact that only one in ten EU traders involved in the sale of goods 
exports within the EU suggests that there is a lot of room for 
increasing participation in cross-border trade. From this, one might 
conclude that the extensive margin is very large. 
This conclusion, however, would be too hasty. The fact that 90 
percent of traders do not export to other EU member states does not 
mean that 90 percent of traders would export other EU member states 
if the barriers to trade were lower. Some traders may have no interest 
in exporting and many traders are involved in the sale of goods for 
which there is essentially no international market – i.e., the market 
for such goods is entirely local. Recall that a neighborhood bakery or 
butcher shop is a “trader involved in the sale of goods.” 
Instead, one should look for evidence on the number of companies 
who are not trading cross-border but want to. The Flash EB surveys 
cited by the Proposal are helpful here. These surveys asked each 
respondent whether they were (1) currently buying or selling cross-
border, (2) not currently buying or selling cross-border, but 
                                               
12 The Proposal provides no citation for this figure, but it may come from 
Flash Eurobarometer 196, “Observatory of European SMEs” (Flash EB 196), 
which was a survey conducted by the Gallup Organization in November-
December 2006 of 16,339 SMEs in the 27 EU member states. See Summary, 
Flash EB 196 (2007). 
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considering doing so, or (3) not interested in selling or buying cross-
border. The third group was excluded from the sample, so the sample 
included only businesses that were interested in cross-border trade. 
Thus, the Flash EB 320 and 321 surveys allow us to see how large is 
the group of traders who are interested but not engaged in cross-
border trade relative to the group of traders already engaged in cross-
border trade. 
The results of the two surveys were essentially identical: more 
than 91 percent of enterprises were currently buying or selling cross-
border.13 We can now reconsider the earlier statistic that only one in 
10 traders involved in the sale of goods exports within the EU. This 
does not mean that 9 in 10 traders would export cross-border if the 
barriers to trade were lower. Instead, the number is probably much 
smaller. If 91 percent of the traders who want to trade are already 
trading, this implies that the extensive margin is less than 1 in 100 
traders.14 
A caveat is in order here: this number is a rough cut of the Flash 
EB data and is not at all a precise estimate of the extensive margin.15 
Rather, the point is that the Proposal rests on an empirical claim that 
there is a significant number of businesses out there, especially SMEs, 
that want to trade cross-border but do not because of barriers to trade. 
The Flash EB surveys cited by the Proposal indicate that the number 
of such traders are relatively small.  
                                               
13 The shares already engaged in cross-border trade was 91.6 percent (B2B) 
and 91.5 percent (B2C). 
14 If 1 out of 10 traders, or 10 percent of traders, are currently exporting, and 
traders currently exporting are 91.5 percent of traders interested in 
exporting, then traders interested in exporting make up 0.10/0.915 = 0.109 = 
10.9 percent of all traders. Traders interested in exporting but not already 
doing so make up 10.9 – 10.0 = 0.9 percent of all traders. 
15 One limitation of this estimate is that the Flash EB surveys asked traders 
about buying or selling cross-border, while the statistic cited by the Proposal 
referred only to traders exporting. Thus, these two sets of numbers are not, 
strictly speaking, comparable. Note, though, that in the B2C context, cross-
border transactions with consumers are by definition exports only; and the 
B2C numbers were virtually identical to the B2B numbers. 
  7 
 
TABLE 1: NUMBER OF ENTERPRISES, BY SIZE, FLASH EB SURVEYS 
 
 B2B 
 
B2C 
 Number Percent  Number Percent 
Micro (1-9)  4,077 63.0  3,678 56.9 
Small (10-49) 1,684 26.0  1,882 29.1 
Medium (50-249) 553 8.5  695 10.8 
Large (250+) 161 2.5  210 3.2 
All Respondents 6,475 100.0  6,465 100.0 
Note: Parentheses contain number of employees in enterprises of each 
category. Source: Flash EB 320 (B2B); Flash EB 321 (B2C). 
Why might it make sense that the extensive margin would be 
small? Many SMEs, especially small and micro enterprises, are 
engaged in inherently local trade. While many SMEs may aspire to 
trade cross-border, it is likely that many more do not. And since the 
vast majority of all enterprises are small and micro enterprises (see 
Table 1), one might expect the extensive margin to be small: the few 
large companies are already trading cross-border, while a large 
fraction of the many small companies are not interested in it. Indeed, 
a strong predictor of SME participation in cross-border trade is the 
size of its home country (SMEs in small countries trade more),16 which 
suggest that geographical, rather than legal, barriers are the primary 
determinants of cross-border trade. 
                                               
16 Flash EB 196, 5, 16. 
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TABLE 2: PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EMPLOYMENT, BY ENTERPRISE SIZE, 
 FLASH EB SURVEYS 
 B2B  B2C 
Micro (1-9)  4.1  4.2 
Small (10-49) 9.2  10.6 
Medium (50-249) 15.1  17.8 
Large (250+) 71.6  67.4 
All Respondents 100.0  100.0 
Source: Flash EB 320 (B2B); Flash EB 321 (B2C). 
The extensive margin looks even smaller when one considers not 
the number of companies on the extensive margin, but the share of 
employment on the extensive margin. Although small and micro 
enterprises account for nearly 90 percent of the companies in the 
sample, they account for only a little more than 10 percent of total 
employment.17 See Table 2. Because small and micro enterprises 
account for a small share of total employment, even a large rise in 
their participation in cross-border trade will have a modest effect on 
the volume of trade. 
2.2 The intensive margin 
The Proposal observes that “the majority of [traders] who do [export] 
only export to a small number of Member States.” This claim is 
validated by the Flash EB survey results, which indicate that among 
enterprises that trade cross-border, approximately 60 percent trade 
                                               
17 These shares are calculated after removing the two largest employers from 
each of the Flash EB 320 and 321 samples. Out of over 6,000 enterprises, the 
two largest in each survey accounted for approximately half of all 
employment. Including these enterprises skews the numbers even more 
strongly in favor of large companies. I use the truncated sample in the 
remainder of this paper; for the remaining results, truncation has no effect. 
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with three other countries or fewer.18 This suggests that, while the 
extensive margin may be small, there may be room on the intensive 
margin for policies to increase participation in cross-border trade.  
FIGURE 1: PERCENTAGE OF ENTERPRISES ENGAGED IN CROSS-BORDER 
TRADE WITH 4 OR MORE MEMBER STATES, BY ENTERPRISE SIZE, B2C 
 
Note: Excludes traders not engaged in cross-border trade. 
Source: Flash EB 321. 
Once again, though, this statistic should be taken with care. A 
closer look at the data reveals that intensity of cross-border trade is 
strongly correlated with firm size. See Figure 1.19 Only among micro 
and small enterprises do the majority of enterprises trade with three 
or fewer other countries. Even among small enterprises nearly half of 
them are already trading with four or more other countries.  
This pattern in the data is consistent with two stories: First, as 
noted above, it may simply be that the bulk of micro enterprises are 
not in a position to trade more broadly, even if contract-law-related 
barriers (or any other barriers) are reduced. If so, the intensive 
margin is small. Second, it may be that contract-law-related barriers 
to trade are greatest for micro enterprises, and this is why they 
                                               
18 The shares are 59.9 percent (B2B) and 60.5 percent (B2C). 
19 Figure 1 provides B2C data; B2B data yields the same pattern. 
0
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disproportionately fail to engage in cross-border trade. In this case, 
the intensive margin may be large. The Proposal accepts this view, 
saying that “dealings with various national laws are burdensome 
particularly for SME,”20 and the Companion Document goes on to note 
that the burden falls especially on “micro and small enterprises.”21  
If this latter account is true, then we should see evidence that 
micro enterprises are more concerned than large enterprises about the 
problems presented by contract law. If, however, the less intense 
cross-border trade by SMEs is because SMEs are less interested in 
cross-border trade than large companies, we should expect them to be 
less concerned than large companies about contract-law-related 
barriers to trade. 
This brings us to Claim 2: that contract-law-related barriers to 
trade are an impediment to trade by SMEs in particular. As I describe 
below, SMEs are less concerned about contract-law-related barriers 
than large enterprises. 
2.3 Contract-Law-Related Barriers to Trade, Particularly for SMEs 
Before comparing the attitudes of SMEs and large enterprises about 
contract-law-related barriers, we must first review the evidence on 
contract-law-related barriers cited by the Proposal. The Proposal 
states: 
“Surveys [citing Flash EB 320 and 321] show that out of the range 
of obstacles to cross-border trade including tax regulations, 
administrative requirements, difficulties in delivery, language and 
culture, traders ranked contract-law-related obstacles among the 
top barriers to cross-border trade.”22 
This is true. The Flash EB surveys identify four contract-related 
barriers, each of which easily falls in the top ten potential barriers to 
trade listed in the Flash EB surveys. But given the structure of the 
Flash EB surveys, this is an uninteresting result – the top ten 
potential barriers to trade were the only ten potential barriers to trade 
that the Flash EB survey described in its questionnaire. 
                                               
20 Proposal, 3. 
21 COM 636(2011) final, 2. 
22 Proposal, 2. 
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TABLE 3: PERCENTAGE OF ENTERPRISES IDENTIFYING A POTENTIAL 
BARRIER AS HAVING A LARGE OR SOME IMPACT, B2C SURVEY 
Potential Barrier to 
Cross-Border Trade 
“Large” or  
“Some” Impact 
Tax regulations  24 
Learning about foreign contract law  23 
Administrative requirements, e.g., licensing 21 
Compliance with foreign consumer protection rules 20 
Conflict resolution/cost of litigation abroad 19 
Obtaining legal advice on foreign contract law 19 
Language 18 
After-sales maintenance abroad 16 
Cross-border delivery 15 
Cultural Differences 11 
Source: Flash EB 321. 
Nonetheless, the contract-law-related barriers included in the 
Flash EB surveys were rated as about as significant as the other 
potential barriers, such as tax regulations and problems with cross-
border delivery. Table 3 lists all ten potential barriers and the 
percentage of respondents identifying them as having “a large effect” 
or “some effect” on the company’s decision to buy or sell cross-border. 
The four contract-law-related barriers are placed in italics.23 They are 
not all at the top, but they are not all at the bottom either. While the 
Proposal overstates the import of the Flash EB surveys, the empirical 
data do not foreclose the significance of contract law to cross-border 
trade. 
                                               
23 The list for the B2B survey is similar, although “Difficulty in agreeing on 
the foreign applicable law” replaces “The need to comply with different 
consumer protection rules in the foreign contract laws” – and ranks much 
lower. See Summary, Flash EB 320, 7. 
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TABLE 4: CONTRACT LAW IN CROSS-BORDER SALES, B2C SURVEY 
 
 
Unimportant 
Barrier 
Small Barrier 
Medium or 
Great Barrier 
Micro (1-9)  47.7 16.8 35.5 
Small (10-49) 42.1 18.8 39.2 
Medium (50-249) 40.7 19.1 40.1 
Large (250+) 38.9 18.3 42.8 
All Respondents 45.0 17.7 37.3 
Note: Percentages may not add to 100 because of rounding. 
Source: Flash EB 321. 
But what about SMEs, and small and micro enterprises in 
particular? How are they affected by contract law, relative to larger 
companies? The data from the Flash EB surveys indicate that SMEs 
are less concerned about contract-law-related barriers to trade than 
large companies. Table 4 reveals that micro enterprises are less likely 
to consider contract law to be a “medium” or “great” barrier to cross-
border trade, and more likely to consider it an “unimportant” barrier, 
than large enterprises.24 This evidence rejects the view that the low 
intensity of cross-border trade by SMEs is the product of contract-law-
related barriers. Indeed, a survey not cited by the Proposal finds that 
46 percent of exporting SMEs did identify any constraint on their 
cross-border trade, and only 8 percent identified a contract-law-related 
obstacle (“different regulations in other EU countries”) as their main 
constraint.25  
In sum, a closer look at the Flash EB data tends to undermine the 
hypothesis that there are large extensive and intensive margins along 
which policies can increase participation in cross-border trade by 
                                               
24 The B2B survey, Flash EB 320, yields the same pattern. 
25 Summary, Flash EB 196, 16. 
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SMEs. Further, while contract law is recognized by many traders as 
an obstacle to trade, contract-law-related barriers do not distinguish 
themselves from a number of other obstacles to trade considered in the 
Flash EB surveys.  
Nonetheless, small extensive and intensive margins are different 
from no margins at all. Even a small increase in intra-EU trade would 
involve a huge amount of commerce. Intra-EU export trade easily 
exceeds €2 trillion (i.e., million million) per year.26 A 0.1 percent 
increase in trade, for example, would amount to thousands of millions 
of Euros. 
Thus, reducing the obstacles to trade created by contract law 
remains an project worth serious consideration, although we need to 
be realistic about the extent of its potential impact. This bring us to 
the ultimate question about CESL and cross-border trade by SMEs: 
Will CESL reduce the barriers to cross-border trade affecting those 
SMEs that are “on the margin” of increasing their cross-border trade? 
2.4 Empirical evidence on CESL and the needs of SMEs 
This is hard to answer empirically. As others have noted, one of the 
weaknesses of the Flash EB surveys is that they asked questions 
about contract law in the abstract, including asking for opinions about 
the benefits of a hypothetical European contract law without 
specifying its contents.27 For this reason, theoretical analysis of its 
likely benefits and burdens is important, and many of the papers in 
this volume address this need.  
It turns out, however, that the Flash EB surveys do provide a few 
results with respect to certain major features of CESL. Recall that 
CESL is an optional instrument, applicable to cross-border 
transactions. The Flash EB surveys specifically asked businesses 
about their views of the utility of a common European sales law, 
depending on whether it is an optional instrument, and depending on 
whether it is applicable only to cross-border transactions. The B2C 
survey asked, “If a European contract law was developed, what would 
you prefer for your business-to-consumer transactions?” and gave 
                                               
26 See Europe in Figures – Eurostat Yearbook 2011, ch. 9 “International 
Trade” (European Commission 2011) (citing Eurostat (tet00039) 
<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&languag
e=en&pcode=tet00039>). 
27 This criticism was raised by Ackermann, “Das Gemeinsame Europäische 
Kaufrecht – eine sinnvolle Option für B2B-Geschäfte?“ in Remien, Herrler 
and Limmer (Eds.), Gemeinsames Europäisches Kaufrecht für die EU? (C.H. 
Beck 2012), 49, at 53-54. 
14 William H. J. Hubbard  
 
three options. (The B2B survey asked the corresponding question for 
B2B transactions.) The three choices were: 
(1) “A common EU contract law replacing 27 national contract 
laws.”  
(2) “A European contract law that you could choose as an 
alternative to the national laws for both your cross-border and 
domestic transactions.”  
(3) “A European contract law that you could choose as an 
alternative to the national laws for your cross-border transactions 
only.” 
The latter two choices describe an optional instrument, and the third 
choice describes an optional instrument for cross-border transactions 
only, which is how CESL is structured.28  
The surveyed businesses resoundingly reject this third option. In 
both the B2B and B2C surveys, only 15.3 percent of the respondents 
who expressed a preference selected the third option.29 The 
overwhelming preference was for the opposite choice: a single, 
mandatory European contract law regime that displaces all 27 
national contract laws.30 
Even more illuminating are the results when broken down by size 
of enterprise. Given the focus of CESL on SMEs, one might hope that 
among traders, SMEs are more favorably disposed toward the third 
option – but the opposite is true. See Table 5.31  
                                               
28 For reasons that will become obvious shortly, it is important to note that 
Art. 13(a) of CESL provides for individual Member States to extend its 
coverage to domestic transactions. Proposal, 28. 
29 Not everyone expressed a preference. In the B2B survey, 12.9 percent of 
respondents did not select one of the choices; in the B2C survey, the non-
response rate was 10.7 percent. 
30 This empirical result seems to confirm the theoretical prediction made by 
Ganuza and Gomez in this volume: “the rule that limits the choice of the 
CESL solely [to] cross-border transaction . . . does not seem a happy one.” 
Ganuza and Gomez, “Optional Law for Firms and Consumers: An Economic 
Analysis of Opting into the Common European Sales Law,” 8, 14-15. 
31 Table 5 presents results for the B2C survey; the B2B results are similar. 
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TABLE 5: PREFERENCES FOR EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW,  
B2C SURVEY, BY ENTERPRISE SIZE ( PERCENT) 
 
Replaces 
National 
Laws 
Optional,  
Domestic and 
Cross-Border 
Optional,  
Cross-Border 
Only 
Micro (1-9)  53.8 32.4 13.8 
Small (10-49) 53.3 30.6 16.2 
Medium (50-249) 49.3 31.7 18.9 
Large (250+) 53.7 25.4 20.9 
All Respondents 53.2 31.6 15.3 
Note: Percentages may not add to 100 because of rounding. Responses 
“Don’t know” or “NA” are excluded. Source: Flash EB 321. 
Why the lack of enthusiasm for the third option? The Flash EB 
surveys did not ask businesses to explain their answers, but the 
patterns in the data we have seen so far suggest the following 
explanation:  
Most small businesses, and especially micro enterprises, are likely 
to transact cross-border business, if at all, in one or two other Member 
States.32 Thus, while the need to account for multiple contract law 
regimes may be a source of significant transactions costs for SMEs, 
the economies of scale associated with moving to a uniform law for 
cross-border transactions are small. For many micro enterprises, the 
benefit of a uniform European law for cross-border contracts may be 
zero, because they are interested in trading with only one additional 
Member State – and whether a business has to learn about CESL or 
about that Member State’s law, it is one new legal regime either way. 
Similarly, an SME that trades with, say, three other Member 
States could at best reduce the number of legal systems governing its 
contracts by 50 percent, from four to two (CESL plus its domestic 
contract law). I say “at best,” because this assumes that the SME 
                                               
32 See Section 2, supra. 
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succeeds at making CESL the governing law in every one of its cross-
border contracts. If not, there may be no savings at all.33 
On the other hand, a mandatory instrument that applies to all 
contracts domestically and cross-border will benefit an SME 
interested in trading with even one other Member State. It reduces by 
50 percent the number of legal systems that SME must learn (from 
two to one). An SME that trades with three other Member States 
would be guaranteed a 75 reduction in legal regimes (from four to 
one). Thus, one can see why a mandatory regime would be so popular 
among SMEs.  
There are obvious political and practical reasons why such a 
mandatory regime is infeasible. For this reason, it is worth noting that 
an optional regime that applies both domestically and cross-border 
has the potential, in a best-case scenario, to generate the same 
savings.34 
These results are summarized in Table 6 for various numbers of 
trading partner states and for the three choices of European contract 
law offered by the Flash EB survey. Table 6 also helps make sense of 
the fact that large businesses seem more tolerant of the possibility of 
an optional, cross-border instrument. (Note that the Flash EB surveys 
did not limit the optional instrument to transactions involving SMEs, 
as CESL does.) It is the largest companies – the companies who are 
most likely to do business in many Member States – who stand to gain 
the most from an optional cross-border contract law regime, given the 
economies of scale associated with the fixed costs of learning a new set 
of legal rules. And the differences in savings between a mandatory 
European contract law and an optional one are much smaller for a 
business trading with 27 countries than a business trading with one.35 
                                               
33 It is possible in the B2B context, given that CESL is optional, that some 
businesses may experience a rise in the number of contract law systems with 
which they must contend, and thus a rise in costs. 
34 Again, by best-case scenario, I refer to a situation in which a business is 
able to conduct all of its transactions under the optional law. 
35 Hence, it is worth noting that Art. 13(b) of CESL provides for individual 
Member States to extend its coverage to B2B transactions not involving 
SMEs. Proposal, 28. 
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TABLE 6: REDUCTION IN NUMBER OF LEGAL REGIMES  
REQUIRED TO LEARN, BY BREADTH OF CROSS-BORDER TRADE  
AND NATURE OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 
Number of Other 
Member States 
Replaces 
National 
Laws 
Optional:  
Domestic and 
Cross-Border 
Optional:  
Cross-Border 
Only 
1 50% up to 50% 0% 
3 75% up to 75% up to 50% 
10 91% up to 91% up to 83% 
27 96% up to 96% up to 93% 
Note: Maximum number of trading partners is 27 when including 
Scotland as the 28th legal regime in the EU. 
3. Contract-Law-Related Barriers for Consumers 
So far, this paper has focused on the empirical claims related to CESL 
from the perspective of businesses, especially SMEs, interested in 
cross-border trade. In this section, I turn to the empirical claims 
motivating CESL’s provisions governing consumer contracts. I begin 
by addressing Claim 3, and in particular the claim that more than half 
of all online, cross-border purchase attempts fail.36 I then consider the 
evidence on whether contract law creates barriers to cross-border B2C 
transactions (Claim 4). Finally, I conclude by considering some 
empirical data relevant to one of the salient motivations for CESL’s 
consumer-related provisions: the need for greater mandatory 
consumer protections. 
3.1. Do sellers reject half of all online, cross-border purchase 
attempts? 
The Companion Document states: “In practice, attempts to purchase 
products online more often fail than succeed in a cross-border context 
and often end-up with a disappointing message such as ‘this product is 
                                               
36 See Companion Document, 3. 
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not available for your country of residence.’”37 This claim rests on a 
citation to the Scoreboard,38 which in turn cites a 2009 
YouGovPsychonomics study commissioned by the EC (“YouGov 
Study”),39 which found that 61 percent of attempts at online, cross-
border purchases failed, and that 50 out of that 61 percent failed 
because the seller refused to sell to the consumer’s country.40 
If this statistic is representative of the actual experiences of 
consumers, then there is indeed a serious problem with online B2C 
contracts in the European Union. And perhaps it is differences in 
contract law that lead to half of all online, cross-border purchase 
attempts being rejected because the seller refuses to sell to the buyer’s 
country. If so, there may be a real need to address B2C contracts at 
the European level. Still, this statistic is surprising; is it possible that 
in practice more than half of online purchase attempts are rejected by 
the seller?  
A closer look at the data tells a less dramatic story. First, the 
YouGov Study points out that in 52 percent of all attempts at online, 
cross-border purchases the seller did not provide for shipping outside 
of the seller’s home country.41 Thus, the entire result – that half of all 
online, cross-border purchase attempts are rejected because the seller 
does not serve the buyer’s country – is explained by the fact that half 
of all online retailers do not ship internationally.42  
Second, the YouGov Study, by design, did not target online 
retailers that purport to serve more than one country; instead the goal 
of that study was to target any retailer that had any online presence 
at all. In this respect the study was successful: the study identified 
nearly 17,000 offers on 100 different consumer products from over 
                                               
37 Companion Document, 3. 
38 SEC 385(2010), 9. 
39 “Mystery shopping evaluation of cross-border e-commerce in the EU,” 
YouGovPsychonomics (2009)), cited in Scoreboard, SEC 385(2010), 27 n. 12. 
40 YouGov Study, 24. 
41 YouGov Study, 28. 
42 This does not mean that contract law is not the problem: it could be that 
sellers are reluctant to ship cross-border because of concerns about contract 
law. Indeed, in the internet context, one might wonder what difference in 
costs to the seller, other than contract law, would deter a seller from trading 
cross-border; shipping costs may not differ much and may be borne by the 
purchaser anyway. But the fact that half of all sellers do not ship 
internationally could simply reflect the fact that many retailers target a more 
local audience, and are not interested in competing with larger, more 
internationally focused internet retailers. The data do not refute the 
hypothesis that contract law is causing the problems identified by the 
YouGov Study, but the data do not prove it, either. 
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4,000 online retailers.43 Thus, if consumers randomly selected retailers 
with an online presence and attempted to make purchases, they would 
fail more than half the time – this is what the YouGov Study 
meticulously shows. It is not true, however, that in practice consumers 
cannot make purchases half the time. Instead, both the Flash EB 299 
data and the Scoreboard data show that no more than 8 percent of 
consumers who shop online in a 12 month period are unable to 
complete an online, cross-border purchase at least once during that 
period.44 
3.2. Do consumers perceive contract-law-related barriers to online 
shopping? 
The relatively low rate with which consumers experience problems 
with online, cross-border shopping suggests that differences in 
contract law may not be quite as large a problem as the Companion 
Document implies. Indeed, the Scoreboard data suggest that 
consumers do not perceive serious problems with contract law when 
shopping online. When consumers who make purchases online were 
asked why they shopped online, 49 percent said that “certainty about 
legal rights” was a “very important” reason, just behind “lower prices” 
(50 percent).45 See Table 7. This bears repeating: about half of all 
consumers who shop online say they do so because it offers certainty 
about legal rights. 
                                               
43 YouGov Study, 19. The majority of retailers identified made offers on only 
one of the 100 products searched for. 
44 According to Flash EB 299a, of EU consumers who had engaged in distance 
purchases in the last 12 months, 8 percent encountered at least once a seller 
who had refused to sell or deliver to them. Analytical Report, Flash EB 299a, 
9. According to Scoreboard, 11 percent of online shoppers reported a problem 
when buying or ordering goods, and most of these consumers reported 
problems other than a refusal to sell, such as delivery delays or technical 
failures with the website. Scoreboard, 24-25. 
45 When including both “very important” and “to some extent” responses, 
“certainty about legal rights” comes in first among the eight reasons offered. 
Scoreboard, 24. 
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TABLE 7: PERCENT OF ONLINE CONSUMERS DESCRIBING  
REASON FOR SHOPPING ONLINE AS “VERY IMPORTANT” 
 
Reason 
Very  
Important 
Lower prices 50 
Certainty about legal rights and guarantee 49 
Convenience 48 
User-friendliness of the website 45 
Unavailability of the good in the area or region 45 
Wider choice of goods and services 39 
Certified quality of the website or availability 
of recognized trust mark 
35 
Ratings and feedbacks on the website from 
other users 
31 
Note: Percentages may not add to 100 because of rounding. 
Source: Scoreboard, 24. 
On the other hand, when consumers who had not shopped online 
were asked why they did not, the most common reasons given were 
“Prefer to shop in person” (20 percent) and “Have no need” (17 
percent). The top-ranking reason that seems related to contract law, 
“trust concerns/receiving or returning goods, complaints or redress” (9 
percent) came in a distant fifth place.46  
One limitation of this data is that these questions do not 
distinguish between domestic and cross-border online purchases. This 
is a weakness of the cited Flash EB surveys as well. In general, they 
do not ask companies or consumers to compare their experiences in 
domestic trade with their experiences in cross-border trade. As a 
                                               
46 Scoreboard, 25. 
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consequence, it is hard to tell whether these statistics apply equally to 
domestic and cross-border online shopping.  
Fortunately, there was at least one question in the Flash EB 299 
survey that made such a direct comparison. In this question 
consumers who had made at least one distance purchase – i.e., by 
internet, post, or phone – in the last 12 months whether they had 
experienced any problems with the delivery of the goods they had 
ordered. As Table 8 shows, consumers reported no more delivery 
problems with cross-border purchases from other Member States than 
from their home countries. (Indeed they reported slightly fewer.) This 
result suggests that cross-border transactions may involve fewer 
problems than we might otherwise assume. 
TABLE 8: PERCENT OF CONSUMERS WHO EXPERIENCED DELAY OR NON-
DELIVERY OF DISTANCE PURCHASES, BY SELLER LOCATION 
 
Delay in 
Delivery 
No Delivery 
at All 
Consumer’s Own Country  18 6 
Another Member State 16 5 
Non-EU Country 19 6 
Source: Summary, Flash EB 299, 20. 
3.3. Is there a need for higher, uniform consumer protection? 
One theme that runs throughout the European Commission’s 
activities in the area of contract law is a strong commitment to 
consumer protection, often through the use of mandatory rules. CESL 
is no exception. It provides “a single set of mandatory rules which offer 
a high level of consumer protection.”47 
To the extent that this replicates the degree of consumer 
protection already present in the law of most EU nations, this 
approach seems to jibe with the attitudes of most European 
consumers. The recent Flash EB survey of consumers indicates that 
                                               
47 Proposal, 4. 
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consumers are largely satisfied with existing consumer protections. 
See Table 9. By a 2-to-1 margin, consumers agreed with the statement 
that sellers in their countries respected their rights.48 (The survey did 
not ask about sellers in other Member States.) 
TABLE 9: CONSUMER ATTITUDES TOWARD EXISTING CONSUMER 
PROTECTIONS 
 
Agree/Tend 
to Agree 
Disagree/Tend 
to Disagree 
You are adequately protected  
by existing measures to protect 
consumers 
57 35 
In general, sellers in your country 
respect your rights as a consumer 
65 28 
Note: Percentages responding “Don’t Know/NA” are omitted.  
Source: Summary, Flash EB 299, 23. 
To the extent that CESL serves to increase, rather than preserve, 
the level of mandatory consumer protection, its merits are less clear. 
Because CESL is an optional instrument, it may offer advantages for 
those consumers who desire greater protections than currently 
available to them. On the other hand, mandatory consumer 
protections do not come for free. They raise the costs of sellers, and 
therefore raise the prices that all consumers must pay. Further, Bar-
Gill and Ben-Shahar argue that mandatory consumer protections will 
subsidize sophisticated consumers, who know to invoke them, at the 
expense of the “poor, the elderly, the less educated.”49 
Here, the Flash EB surveys make a final contribution. The 
consumer attitudes survey examined which consumers were the most 
likely to identify a problem with their purchase and complain to the 
seller about it. And it finds that, as Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar predict, 
                                               
48 Interestingly, trust in sellers to respect consumer’s rights was higher than 
trust in public authorities to protect the consumer’s rights. Summary, Flash 
EB 299, 23. 
49 Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, “Regulatory Techniques in Consumer Protection: 
A Critique of the Common European Sales Law,” 9. 
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the elderly and least educated are far less likely to invoke their rights 
by complaining to a seller than the younger and more educated. See 
Figure 2. The concern that the most vulnerable groups will be cross-
subsidizing the most advantaged may not be speculative. 
FIGURE 2: PERCENTAGE OF CONSUMERS IDENTIFYING A PROBLEM AND 
COMPLAINING TO THE SELLER, BY EDUCATION AND AGE 
 
Note: “Least Educated” left school before age 16; “Most educated” 
continued school past age 20. Source: Analytical Report, Flash EB 
299, 132. 
4. Conclusion 
The Proposal and its Companion Document cite a number of 
surveys in support of their central empirical claims: that there are 
SMEs and consumers who want engage in cross-border transactions or 
increase their cross-border activity, but do not, and that obstacles 
created by differences in contract law are impediments to cross-border 
trade, especially for SMEs and consumers. A closer look at these 
surveys, especially the Flash Eurobarometer surveys on which the 
Proposal primary relies, reveals that the cited data only ambiguously 
supports these empirical claims. The cited surveys tend to cast doubt 
that the numbers of discouraged traders are large, and the surveys 
make a weak case that contract law is the primary obstacle to cross-
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border trade. Nonetheless, it is plausible that contract law plays a role 
in discouraging a small but economically significant number of traders 
and consumers from cross-border trade.  
Given the controversy surrounding CESL and the numerous 
concerns about the precise ways in which it implements its vision of a 
uniform European sales law, it is worth further study to determine 
whether the empirical claims justifying this project can be validated. 
Studies other than the surveys cited by the Proposal may help to 
support or refute the empirical claims in the Proposal. A better sense 
of the empirical foundations of the Proposal will inform the normative 
and policy-based arguments—many of which are articulated by other 
papers in this volume—that will ultimately determine the fate of 
CESL. 
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